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In the debate about the morality of physician-assisted suicide, it is often taken for granted that for some people death would be preferable to life-people who would be better off dead. In the usual debate, the question 
is whether such a good is worth the potential evils that might accompany 
it (such as the potential devaluation of life, or loss of trust in the medical 
profession), however, the basic idea that some people could benefit from their 
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Abstract
Epicurus wrote that death cannot be bad for a person who dies, since when someone 
dies they no longer exist to be the subject of harm. But his conclusion also applies in the 
converse: Death cannot be good for someone, since after their death they will not exist 
to be the subject of benefit. This conclusion is troubling when it is brought to bear on the 
question of physician assisted suicide. If Epicurus is right, as I think he is, then it means that 
even when someone is dying of a long and painful illness, we cannot say that they would 
be better off dead. I defend this conclusion by first presenting Epicurus’s argument, and 
defending it against some of its more important contemporary critics. I then re-examine 
the conclusion that someone cannot be better off dead by looking at the issue of mercy 
killing and euthanasia. Drawing on the work of philosophers who examine the ethics of 
animal euthanasia, I argue that killing someone who is suffering severe agony can be 
good, but it cannot be good for the person who suffers—it is just good in itself. This, I 
think, is why we have the intuitions that we do around physician assisted suicide: we are 
mistaken about the idea that someone can be better off dead, but we can be correct in 
thinking that sometimes someone’s death is good.
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own deaths is accepted by all sides. And yet, there is also the idea, going back 
to Epicurus, that death cannot hold any value for the person who dies, positive 
or negative. After death, there is no person left to be the subject of benefits 
or harms. If this is correct, then no matter how painful my life is, my death 
cannot ever be good for me. This paper will attempt to defend the Epicurean 
argument that death cannot be a benefit for the one who dies. Regardless of 
the amount of suffering, and how close someone is to the natural end of life, 
I will argue that it is not possible to be better off dead. This will have some 
obvious consequences for the ethics of physician-assisted suicide.
After presenting the Epicurean position, I will attempt to defend it against 
some of its most important modern critics. Most of these critics argue against 
the Epicurean point that death cannot be bad for the person who dies; I will 
reorient these objections in order to argue that death cannot be good for the 
one who dies. Even if physician assisted suicide seems like a humane act of 
mercy, in fact it is not. This is the primary conclusion of my paper, and I think 
that the arguments are valid. However, there appears to be a counter-example 
to my conclusion in cases where people are suffering so much that it would seem 
immoral not to end their lives. Such cases of mercy killing, are, thankfully, rare 
among people, but common in the relationship between people and animals. 
In the last part of the paper, I will look closer at cases of animals and human 
mercy killings in order to check what they mean for my primary Epicurean point. 
There is, I will argue, a way to retain the idea that mercy killings are sometimes 
beneficial while holding on to the Epicurean idea, according to which they are 
not good for the person who dies.
I should note before beginning, that in this paper I am assuming that death 
is really the end of our existence, and that there is no afterlife where we will 
face judgement for our actions in this life. Death, at least for the purposes of 
this paper, is really the end.
I. Epicurus on suicide
Few letters and fragments of text preserve of Epicurus’ original writings, 
however, they are enough to establish what I will call the Epicurean position (his 
actual position is not really a concern here, although it could be an interesting 
question for historians.)1 In the famous Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus wrote:
1 Part of the problem with calling this the “Epicurean” view is that later Epicureans seem to 
have interpreted it differently. Cicero, in De finibus (1:49), presents the Epicurean view of 
death in this way: “The greatest [pains] are curtailed by death, the small ones are punctuated 
by long intervals of peace, and we are in control of those of a medium strength so that if 
they can be endured we endure them and if not we may leave life calmly if it does not please 
us, just as we may leave the theatre.” James Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and his Critics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 206. So, Cicero’s version of Epicurus differs from mine, since 
he endorses suicide as an alternative to a bad life. I will set the issue aside here, since this paper 
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For that which while present causes no distress causes 
unnecessary pain when merely anticipated. So death, the most 
frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, 
death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do 
not exist. Therefore, it is relevant neither to the living nor to the 
dead, since it does not affect the former, and the latter do not 
exist. But the many sometimes flee death as the greatest of bad 
things and sometimes choose it as a relief from the bad things 
in life. But the wise man neither rejects life nor fears death. For 
living does not offend him, nor does he believe not living to be 
something bad. 2
When philosophers write about this passage, they typically focus on his claim 
that death is not bad for the person who dies. My death cannot be bad for 
me, since, when I die, I will not exist to be the subject of any harm. It is 
understandable why philosophers tend to focus on the idea that death is not 
bad for us, since most of us fear death and find it strange to be told that such 
fears are irrational. However, the Epicurean point is actually bigger: death 
is nothing to us, which also means that death cannot be good for one who 
dies. Importantly, Epicurus’ point is unqualified: it does not matter what the 
quality of life is if life is good, death is still not an evil, and if life is bad, death 
is not a relief. Life, even a painful one, is “no offense” to an Epicurean. My 
own death (and by extension my own suicide) can never serve my own self-
interest.
Although not making explicit reference to Epicurus, Christopher Cowley 
describes quite vividly the Epicurean view of suicide: “there is something 
unique in the nature of suicide that makes any attempted ascription of the 
concepts of either rationality or irrationality otiose.”3 Cowley wants to point 
out that it depends on me to decide whether an action would be good for me, 
taking into account that I compare two possible outcomes; if I act according 
to a correct assessment of the relative values of the two outcomes, then I 
am rational, and if I am incorrect (or ignore the relative values of the possible 
outcomes) then I am irrational. If I do not exist in one of the possible worlds 
is not based on historical analysis, but on the different aspect between Epicurus’ view, as I 
approach him here, and Cicero’s analogy that we can “leave the theater.” The theater is our 
life, and we only exist in it.
2 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, in The Epicurus Reader, eds. Brad Inwood, and Lloyd Gerson 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1994), 29; 125-126.
3 Christopher Cowley, “Suicide is Neither Rational nor Irrational,” Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice: An International Forum 9, no. 5 (2006): 469.
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that would result from my action, then I cannot compare their values for me. 
I can contemplate a world without me, but such a world cannot have a value 
for me. Non-existence is not value-neutral, it is value-less. Suicide, Cowley 
argues, simply cannot be rational. I cannot judge a decision as valuable for 
me, if I do not exist in the world that would result from that decision.4
Compare the question of suicide with that of killing another person. 
When we contemplate killing someone, we can genuinely compare two 
possible futures – one with the person in it, and another without them. The 
agent contemplating the killing can then decide which is better for them. 
The asymmetry here is that the person contemplating killing another will 
exist in both worlds, but the person contemplating suicide will not. Of 
course, someone contemplating suicide can ask what the world would be 
like without them, and if they were consequentialists, this might be enough 
for them to decide if their suicide would be moral. You may, for example, 
choose suicide to spare your family the expense of medical treatment; or, to 
use Hume’s example,5 someone may decide that suicide is the best if they are 
under arrest and aware that they will spill their secrets under interrogation. 
However, these kinds of reasons for committing suicide, whether they are 
good or bad, do not really refer to the Epicureans’ point. These reasons for 
suicide concern goods for others (family, friends, or compatriots) and not the 
suicidal person’s well-being. Desiring suicide for the sake of your loved ones 
is not to say that suicide is good for you, but that it is good for them, which 
is outside the scope of this paper.6
As mentioned above, my intention is not to focus on the historical 
Epicurean movement. However, it might be noteworthy to compare my 
arguments with the Epicurean position. Epicureans often said that if one lives 
well, then one can always find pleasures in life (or at least in memories of 
happiness) and that no right-living person should want to hasten death, even 
if they are dying in a painful condition.7 At first glance, this seems to support 
my position that death can never be good for the person who dies, but it 
does not seem so simple. After all, if life is bad enough that there is no way 
4 Although Herstein does not discuss the matter in terms of death (or suicide), he argues, 
essentially, the same conclusion: non-existent people (in terms of possible but not actual 
people) do not have neutral value, but entirely lack of any well-being. Ori J. Herstein, “Why 
‘Nonexistent People’ Do Not Have Zero Wellbeing but No Wellbeing at All,” Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 30, no. 2 (2013): 136-145.
5 David Hume, “Of Suicide,” in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller 
(Indianapolis, Liberty Classics, 1985), 587.
6 Lori Gruen discusses commendably the social aspect of death which is often ignored in the 
literature on Philosophy of Death (including the present paper). Lori Gruen, ‘‘Death as a Social 
Harm,’’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 52, S1 (2014): 53-65.
7 Warren, 137.
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to escape to a happy memory, or if one did not have any such memories to 
call on, then an Epicurean might say that death would be a relief. This would 
be rare, but it could happen.8 This line of thought leans on the Epicurean 
idea that life is about pleasure and avoidance of pain. Since there will be no 
pleasure or pain in death, a life with any pleasure is better than death, and 
conversely that death is better than a life of pain. But this clearly runs up 
against the mistake that Cowley identified of confusing death with a neutral 
state, when, in fact, it is a non-state. Then, at least some Epicureans do not 
adhere to the Epicurean position as I am presenting it here.
I think that my version of the Epicurean position on suicide can be 
fruitfully elucidated by considering Kant’s critique of the ontological 
argument about God’s existence. Kant agreed that there were qualities that 
make a being God-like (omniscience, omnipotence, etc.), however, existence 
is not one of them.9 Existence is not itself a property but the condition under 
which a thing can coherently be said to have properties. So, while God must 
have all the properties that it is better to have than not to have, we cannot 
thereby conclude that God exists. This strategy has an obvious parallel to the 
question of death. There are qualities that make a life good, and those that 
make a life bad, but life itself cannot be one of those qualities. It sits before 
them, and as such, its presence or absence cannot be counted as positive or 
negative. While the presence of pleasure can be good (and the removal of 
pleasure can be bad), the absence of life cannot have any value. Likewise, it is, 
on this view, analytically true that death can never be beneficial to me. After 
suicide, I do not suffer, but not because of pain’s relief. There is no me left to 
be the recipient of benefit. Suicide, then, cannot be in my own rational self-
interest, any more than non-existence can be bad for the goodness of God. 
This is a categorical claim and does not depend on what kind of life you are 
leading.
It is worth to examine briefly how this Kantian argument against suicide 
relates to Kant’s actual argument against suicide.10 It turns out to be similar, 
but perhaps more powerful. Suicide, for Kant, is a betrayal of that which 
is most important: our rational, self-directed consciousness. Or, to put it 
another way, Kant thought that by committing suicide, I am treating myself 
as a means to the end of alleviating suffering.11 Since it is always immoral to 
8 Walter Englert, “Stoics and Epicureans on the Nature of Suicide,” Proceedings of the Boston 
Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy 10, no. 1 (1994): 95.
9 For a detailed analysis of Kant’s critique of the Ontological Argument, see Ian Proops, “Kant 
on the Ontological Argument,” Nous 49, no. 1 (2015): 1-27.
10 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, eds. Mary Gregor, and Jens 
Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 34.
11 Michael Chobli reviews these arguments by concluding that sometimes a Kantian should 
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treat any moral agent as a means to an end, suicide is immoral. Because our 
worth as rational agents is infinite, it will outweigh any pain or suffering that 
we may want to avoid. 
Kant actual argument against suicide relied on a respect for agency, in a 
kind of transcendental argument. My version relies only on the ability to have 
interests, even if they are not rational interests. Since the question is whether 
death can be in the interest of the one who dies, and not whether suicide can 
be rationally done out of a sense of self-love, my conclusion is wider than 
Kant’s. It does not require a grounding in respect for autonomy or free will, 
and it would also apply to non-human (and hence non-rational) animals. No 
being that can possess good can benefit by their own death. I will return 
to the issue of animal death below, but first, I turn to few criticisms of the 
Epicurean position. 
II. Objections and replies
Thomas Nagel, in a paper published in 1970,12 argued that the Epicurean 
position on death is wrong. Since then a number of philosophers have 
attempted to refine or expand Nagel’s argument. In this section. I will defend 
the Epicurean position against both Nagel’s arguments and some of those 
that have followed. Most of the critics of the Epicurean position criticize the 
idea that death is not bad for the person who dies, so when necessary I will 
translate these arguments to speak directly to my point that death cannot ever 
be good for the person who dies. In most cases this will be straightforward.
Nagel’s criticism of the Epicurean position has come to be called the 
“deprivation view.” In brief, the argument is that since life is goodand 
death deprives us of life, our death is bad for us. Of course, if this line of 
reasoning is valid, then this would be the complementary conclusion: if life 
is bad enough, then since death eliminates life, death would be good. Nagel 
attempted to solve the problem by arguing that things can be atemporally 
bad,that is, bad without reference to a time at which a thing is bad. If I am 
deprived of something that I did not know that I possessed in the first place (a 
relative secretly stealing an inheritance, for instance), it is still a deprivation, 
and still bad for me. Death is bad for a person because it deprives them of 
the goodness of the life they could have led had they not died.13 They are 
not present when this counterfactual life is missing, but the deprivation still 
endorse suicide. In particular, when someone’s personhood is compromised by pain or 
depression. In a way, then, Chobli’s conclusion is similar to the one I reach in this paper. 
Michael Cholbi, “A Kantian Defense of Prudential Suicide,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 7, no. 
4 (2010): 506.
12 Thomas Nagel, “Death,” Nous 4, no. 1 (1970): 73-80.
13 Ibid., 77.
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occurs, in a kind of timeless sense:it is not that my death is bad for me when 
I die, but that my death is just bad for me, even though there will never be a 
time when I am aware of being deprived by death. 
Nagel’s argument that death is bad because it is a deprivation has some 
intuitive appeal, but I think that it actually rests on a mistake: the same 
mistake that one would make in saying that God exists because existence is 
a perfection. Existence is the pre-condition for having perfections, but is not 
itself a perfection. So too, existence is the pre-condition for being deprived 
of good, but is not itself something that you can be deprived of. It is bad to 
be deprived of goods, but to be deprived of something, one must exist. And 
of course, if death cannot be a deprivation harm, it also cannot be a benefit 
by depriving us of something bad. 
Imagine someone who is reading Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient 
Express, and is also suffering from degenerative vision loss. It makes sense to 
say that her loss of vision would thwart her desire to read the final chapter 
and reveal the identity of the killers (set aside, for the purposes of this 
example, the existence of audio books). But if she were to die before reaching 
the end of the book, there is no similar loss. We might say, at her memorial, 
that she would have liked to know the ending of the book, but it is not a 
tragedy that she did not live long enough. Her desire was not thwarted, it was 
eliminated, along with the subject of the desire. Similarly, someone who dies 
with a terrible toothache did not have their desire to get rid of the toothache 
satisfied. Epicurus’s point, at its heart, is that we mistakenly think that we will 
exist after our deaths, but we will not, and so there is no one to be deprived 
of anything. I imagine that when we say things at a memorial service like “at 
least she is no longer suffering from that toothache” we are assuming that 
the deceased exists in some kind of afterlife. But of course, this paper, as well 
as Nagel’s, is working on the assumption that death is really death.
Eric Olson has tried to avoid Nagel’s problem of specifying for whom 
death is bad by arguing against the Epicurean position on more general 
grounds.14 He argues simply that it is good to have pleasure, and it is good 
to have desires fulfilled, and so it must be good to live long enough to 
experience pleasures and the fulfillment of desire. Death is therefore bad, 
since it removes these possibilities. It is not that you suffer after death, but 
that death is bad because it is the negation of the condition required for 
anything to be good. It may not be loss for someone to die before reaching 
the end of a mystery novel, but we still acknowledge that they would have 
taken pleasure from finishing it, and that death means that they will never 
have this pleasure. Death means that some things that we think are good will 
never be achieved. Likewise, presumably, Olson would argue that if something 
14 Eric T. Olson, “The Epicurean View of Death,” The Journal of Ethics 17, nos. 1-2 (2013): 73. 
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is bad, then removing it must be good. Something being bad just means that 
removing it would be good; for Olson is almost analytic: if the death at the 
end of a long, painful illness is not good, then how can anything be good?
While this may seem like an alternative critique of Epicureanism to 
Nagel’s deprivation account, it really boils down to the same point, and my 
response is essentially the same as above. There is no incompatibility with 
saying that it would be good for someone with a toothache to have relief, 
while saying that it would not be good for that person to die. It is bad to have 
the power go out in the middle of watching a football game on television, 
but it is not bad (at least not in the same way) to die in the middle of watching 
a game. In both cases, it is true that you do not see the game, but in the case 
of death, you are not missing anything. Life is a prerequisite for value, which 
explains why things in life can have value, while death cannot. Toothaches are 
bad, and relieving them is good, but death does not relieve them. Presumably, 
Olson would agree that suicide is not a solution to a toothache, and this is 
precisely because things can have value in life, but life (or death) itself cannot.
The problem for critiques of the Epicurean position is a basic one: there 
is no one for death to be bad for. This, of course, is the essence of Epicurus’s 
point. Nagel and Olson emphasize the loss of whatever we value, but if this 
is lost in death, then there is no subject to lose it. Both, then, fail to solve the 
problem of whom death can have value for. Nagel tried to solve the problem 
by taking an atemporal view of value, but there still must be someone that 
such things are atemporally valuable for. Harry Silverstone tries to solve this 
problem by taking an atemporal view of a life itself.15 He argues that I can 
make a judgement about the value of my own death because my death exists 
in the future. Just as there are things that are physically distant from me but 
that nonetheless can be valued by me here, so too my own death, which is 
temporally distant from me, can be valued by me now. There are facts about 
my death (even if I do not know them), and in general it is a fact that I will 
die. In this way, Silverstone takes himself to have solved the problem of how 
one can rationally contemplate their own death: it is possible because one’s 
death, like all events, has an objective existence at some point in time.
This line of thought relies on the notion that future claims have truth 
value now, and while this is debatable, I will not press the issue. Rather, I 
will argue that even if it is true that my death can be rationally considered 
by me now, it does not follow that I can conceive of my death as having 
value for me. Silverstein shows at most that I can coherently consider my 
own death as something that exists in the future – it is less obvious that I can 
stand in a value-relationship to it. When I read about a hurricane happening 
in another place, I can feel sympathy for those who are experiencing it, but 
15 Harry S. Silverstein, “The Evil of Death,” The Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 7 (1980): 401-424.
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it is impossible (or at least not rational) to worry for my own safety because 
of the storm. So too my future death is something that I can conceive of, 
and something that I can imagine others experiencing as good or bad, but it 
is not something that I can have a value relation to, either now or when it 
happens.
Consider a scenario where I must choose between two courses of medical 
treatment, one of which prolongs life but increases suffering, and the other 
minimizes suffering but shortens life. Both choices involve considering death 
as an end-point, and comparing the two possible lives ahead. Death, then, 
is an object of thought that exists in some future. If I choose the life of less 
suffering, my earlier death is not seen as good in itself, but as the price to 
pay for a less painful life. This seems to be a potentially rational choice, that 
is to say, one that could be judged as either rational or irrational. But this is 
not contemplating the value of death, but of the possible lives that precede 
it. Oslon may be right that I can conceive of my death as existing in the 
future, but that only marks out a life that can have value.
And yet, if I am correct that one can rationally compare two potential 
lives of different lengths, then this would seem to imply that in an extreme 
case, one could rationally commit suicide to avoid a painful experience. If I 
can make a rational choice to live a shorter life rather than a longer, painful 
one, cannot I also choose no life instead of a painful one? Suicide, here, just 
seems like a limiting case of choosing a shorter pain-free life to avoid a longer 
painful one. But this view of suicide is mistaken, and the very language that 
attempts to describe it betrays the mistake. One does not avoid anything in 
death. One could choose a short life over a longer one that includes more 
suffering such decisions are made every day, and they are made explicitly in 
order to avoid suffering. But they avoid it only in the sense that there is an 
alternative life without suffering (albeit a shorter life). Choosing to forego 
chemotherapy is avoiding suffering, but it is not suicide. Choosing to die a 
quick death from a cyanide pill rather than die of torture at the hands of the 
enemy is a different kind of choice: one that does not really compare two 
futures at all, and hence cannot be a rational comparison. 
Ultimately, I think that the problem with all of the above-described 
critiques of the Epicurean view of death is that they tacitly rely on an 
assumption that death is not really death. Nagel, Olson, and Silverstein all 
presume a perspective where I am present at (and after) my death and can 
assess the loss that death will bring me. This is understandable (the vast 
majority of human beings throughout history have held a belief in some kind 
of an afterlife) but this is explicitly not the assumption that we start with 
when considering the Epicurean position. 
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III. Assisted suicide
We are now in a position to see how the general Epicurean point applies 
to physician-assisted suicide. These account for only a small fraction of the 
total number of suicides in the United States,16 but they are the subject of 
much philosophical and legal debate. If I am right that death cannot be a 
benefit for the person who dies, it would introduce a new perspective to these 
debates. The existing arguments against the moral permissibility of physician 
assisted suicide in the philosophical literature tend to stand on utilitarian 
grounds, arguing that even if there are some cases where a patient would 
want assisted suicide, legalizing the practice would have overall negative 
effects. No published argument that I know of takes the Epicurean stance.17 It 
seems obvious to many writing about it that there may be times when suicide 
is a rational decision, and that it is, at least, sometimes better to die than to 
continue living.18 
When thinking about physician-assisted suicide, we must consider the 
concrete conditions of those who opt for it. There is, of course, physical 
pain, often uncontrollable even with medication, but patients are also often 
undergoing physical and psychological traumas that seriously undermine 
their sense of self. Patients have cited a desire for dignity in death, as well 
as the desire to avoid the disfigurement or dependency that is often brought 
16 There were 44,965 suicides reported in the United States in 2016, and 643 physician-
assisted suicides. For data on total suicides in the U.S., see Jiaquan Xu, Sherry L. Murphy, 
Kenneth D. Kochanek, Brigham Bastian, and Elizabeth Arias, “Deaths: Final Data for 2016,” 
National Vital Statistics Report 67, no. 5 (2018): 1-75. The total number of physician-assisted 
suicides comes from aggregating the individual numbers from three states that allow them 
(California, Oregon, and Washington). California Department of Public Health, “California 
End of Life Option Act 2016 Data Report,” accessed December 23, 2020, https://www.
cdph.ca.gov/programs/chsi/cdph%20document%20library/cdph%20end%20of%20life%20
option%20act%20report.pdf; Oregon Health Authority, Public Health Division, “Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act 2016,” accessed December 23, 2020, https://www.oregon.gov/
oha/ph/providerpartnerresources/evaluationresearch/deathwithdignityact/documents/year19.
pdf; Washington State Department of Health, “2016 Death with Dignity Act Report,” 
accessed December, 2020, https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/422-109-
DeathWithDignityAct2016.pdf. 
17 In a few recent surveys concerning the arguments against Physician Assisted Suicide, nothing 
relevant to the Epicurean argument was addressed, Jill M. Dietle, “Physician Assisted Suicide: A 
New Look at the Arguments,” Bioethics 21, no. 3 (2007): 127-139; Søren Holm, “The Debate 
about Physician Assistance in Dying: 40 Years of Unrivalled Progress in Medical Ethics?’’ Journal 
of Medical Ethics 41, no. 1 (2015): 40-43.
18 “It is possible to see suicide, not merely as reasonable, but even as noble.” Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
“Rationality and the Fear of Death,” The Monist 59, no. 2 (1979): 200. Another example 
comes from Stephan Blatti, “Death’s Distinctive Harm,” American Philosophical Quarterly 49, 
no. 4 (2012): 322: “Death might not be overall bad for some of those who die, not because 
death is valueless, but because death might be positive.”
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about by advanced stages of terminal diseases.19 These desires are almost 
universally treated as valid, and I will not suggest otherwise, but I do not 
think that they are not valid reasons for desiring death. 
Recall Crowley’s argument for the non-rationality of suicide. The core 
of his argument is that we often make a mistake in thinking about the value 
of life and death. A life of pain has negative value, and a life of pleasure 
has positive value, but death is not neutral. Death has no value, positive 
or negative. Preserving one’s dignity is, in general, worth pursuing, and it 
is generally worth avoiding those situations that would compromise one’s 
dignity. The same can be said for autonomy and independence. We do not 
want to die dependent and without dignity, but that means that we do not 
want to live with indignity or dependence. Death cannot be an escape from 
pain or indignity. It is only an elimination of pain in that it is an elimination of 
the subject of pain. In other words, death cannot be an improvement for the 
person who dies, even if their life was almost entirely negative.
Cowley thought that suicide was outside the bounds of rationality, but 
he did not address physician-assisted suicide. Does the analysis change when 
we consider that people who request physician-assisted suicide are not just 
suffering, but are terminal? Although statutes differ from state to state, in 
order to qualify for legal physician assisted suicide, patients must be certified 
by more than one physician to be in a terminal state, in addition to being in 
tremendous physical pain. Such patients are not just incurable, or untreatable; 
they are terminal. It is not just that they are in pain, or that they are disfigured, 
but that this is, as far as medicine may know, the last part of their lives. Can 
the Epicurean position be maintained in this light?
In this regard, it is worth noting, at least briefly, that Epicurus himself is 
said to have died of an apparently painful condition and did not commit suicide, 
even though there was no social stigma against the practice.20 This is especially 
telling as the Epicurean position is based on the hedonistic idea according 
to which only pleasure is good, while discomfort is bad. A part of why the 
Epicureans, in general, seemed to have avoided suicide is that it forestalls any 
possible future pleasure; if there are no such possibilities, then suicide would 
seem to be a rationally viable option. And yet, the fundamental point that 
death is nothing to us is unforgiving. While we are alive, we are not dead, and 
when we die, we are no longer there to compare its value to our life. Modern 
technological medicine has extended the period of time between dying and 
being dead far beyond what would be normal to Epicurus, however, this does 
not change the underlying rationality that death cannot be anything for us.
19 Michael B. Gill, ‘‘Is the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide Compatible with Good 
End-of-Life Care?’’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2009): 27-45.
20 Englret, 68.
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I argued above that it could be rational to choose between two futures, 
one of which was shorter than the other. In the context of physician-assisted 
suicide, this becomes an important distinction, especially in terms of the law: 
it is the difference between assisted suicide and palliative care that leads to 
death. It is a difference of intent, which is, I think, exactly in line with what 
the Epicurean position demands. It makes sense to choose between a shorter 
life with less pain and a longer life with more pain, but in this calculation, we 
are comparing two future lives, even if both are short. Neither is tantamount 
to suicide, even if one future life is radically shorter than the other. Suicide is 
the choice between a life and non-existence. 
In a very personal and moving account of her father’s death, Susan Wolf 
argues that legalizing assisted suicide would only shelter us from our moral 
duties to comfort and help those who are suffering and dying, and that if we 
take those duties seriously, we will relish every moment we can spend with 
our dying loved ones.21 Her argument is not exactly the one I am making here, 
but it certainly is in the same ballpark. The Epicurean stance does not deny 
the reality of our death, instead it reorients us to the task of ensuring that 
our life is as good as it can be before our death. Ending life intentionally does 
not help this, but more to the point, the idea that we should spend our time 
deciding when or whether to end our lives means that we are not putting that 
energy to ensuring our lives are well lived.  
This line of thought leads naturally to the doctrine of double effect, 
which morally allows one to treat a terminal patient for pain, even at the 
cost of shortening their life, as long as death is not the goal. The doctrine 
of double effect is most commonly invoked by those who hold a sanctity 
of life view, which itself does not fit the Epicurean stance, but the result is 
largely the same.22 The Epicurean would be happy with choosing a course of 
action that would shorten life while alleviating suffering, whereas they would 
see the idea of ending one’s own life to alleviate pain is as incoherent. The 
sanctity of life view cannot countenance intentionally ending a human life 
because it is sacred, whereas the Epicurean cannot countenance intentionally 
ending a life (at least, for its own sake) because life itself cannot have value, 
only experiences in life can. Removing life from someone who is suffering and 
dying, does them no harm, but it also does them no good. Removing their 
21 Susan M. Wolf, “Confronting Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: My Father’s Death,” 
The Hastings Center Report 38, no. 5 (2008): 23-26.
22 Catholic Church’s views on euthanasia exemplify this idea: “The use of painkillers to 
alleviate the sufferings of the dying, even at the risk of shortening their days, can be morally 
in conformity with human dignity if death is not willed as either an end or a means, but only 
foreseen and tolerated as inevitable,” Catechism of the Catholic Church, part III, section II, 
article IV, 2279, accessed December 23, 2020, https://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/
archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm.
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pain does them good, and if the act of doing so shortens their life, it is still 
good, but only while they are alive.
IV. Counterpoint: Mercy killings
If a person’s death cannot have value for them, then every patient who has 
desired to hasten their own deaths in the face of unrelenting agony has been 
irrational. They are perfectly warranted in wanting to alleviate their pain, 
but the idea that they would be better off dead is simply wrong. But, if this 
is true of first-person judgements, then it must also be true of third-person 
judgements as well, and here we see a potential counter-example, since 
we often find cases of mercy killings to be morally unimpeachable. If this 
judgement is correct, then my argument would be in trouble. We will look at 
human cases shortly, but I will begin working through this issue with the case 
of animal euthanasia. 
When an animal is suffering and dying, we often think that killing them is 
permissible, or even that mercy killing is morally required of us. A pet owner, 
who prolongs their companion animal’s life when it is physically suffering, can 
be seen as causing needless pain. Of course, it is difficult to know when a pet 
reaches the point when humane euthanasia is called for, but pet owners,and 
animal health care workers in general, are well aware that such a point exists. 
Pet owners often struggle to know if their pet has reached the point of 
suffering where euthanasia is called for, but nearly all pet owners agree that 
there is a level of suffering at which it is in the animal’s interest to die rather 
than to live with pain.23 
How would an Epicurean understand this claim? There is nothing in 
Epicurus’ surviving writings to suggest that he was at all concerned with the 
deaths of animals (animal death is rarely mentioned even in contemporary 
philosophical discussions of death). Still, it seems easy to apply the Epicurean 
idea to the case of animals. A horse who is suffering and dying, after all, does 
not exist after its death, so, we cannot compare two possible futures for the 
horse by saying that it would be better off dead. If you agree that a horse can 
have interests, then it would seem that we must conclude both that a horse 
has an interest in not suffering, but also that the horse cannot benefit from 
its own death, even if it is suffering. Thus it seems that the Epicurean must 
conclude that the practice of animal euthanasia is irrational. And if we decide 
that killing a suffering animal really is morally required, then it seems that my 
Epicurean argument must be wrong.
There is, however, another way of viewing animal euthanasia. Sarah 
Bachelard argues that the suffering of an animal in severe pain is just brute 
23 James W. Yeats, “Death is a Welfare Issue,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 
23, no. 3 (2010): 236.
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suffering, and that removing this suffering is itself good.24 It is not good for the 
animal to die, but good in general. Bernard Rollin puts the point in a slightly 
different way: a suffering animal is nothing more than its pain, since animals 
cannot distance themselves from their pain through abstraction.25 It is probably 
the case that non-human animals (or at least most of them) do not conceive 
of their future as a unified whole as people do. That is to say, that for animals 
there is only a succession of experiences and not a continuing self. If this is 
correct, then an animal in severe pain really is nothing other than its pain.
Thinking about the suffering of animals in this way sidesteps the question 
of whether death is good for the animal; the animal’s death is just good 
simpliciter. Suffering, on this view, is just bad in itself. Hence, acknowledging 
that killing animals that are in severe pain is good does not imply that Epicurus 
is wrong, just as he would not be made wrong by my death being good for 
someone else. Of course, one would still have to decide how much an animal 
has to be suffering before its death becomes good, but I do not think that we 
have to decide this in order to go forward; it is enough to acknowledge that 
there is a line. The Epicurean stance is, so far at least, secure. The question that 
remains is whether, and to what extent, this model may apply to people. To 
get a handle on the subject, we will turn to a kind of case where it seems most 
clearly to do so: war.
Mercy killings have been a part of warfare since antiquity. Battlefield 
injuries, especially in pre-modern times, often resulted in fellow soldiers putting 
a quick end to their fallen comrades. The practice is less common than it used 
to be, but still remains common enough to be the subject of debate among 
military ethicists.26 Here, we will focus on just one example from the 1982 
Falklands war. The case involved an Argentine soldier that was caught in a jet 
fuel explosion while on a British base.27 Unable to rescue the burning man from 
the fire (and having already rescued another victim) a British Medical Corps 
sergeant shot and killed the Argentinian soldier, rather than allowing him to 
burn to death. Such killings should sit uneasily with us, as they do, no doubt, for 
those who commit them, but they are clearly motivated by a concern for easing 
pain and suffering. What does this say about the possible benefit of death for 
a person that is suffering? Does this offer a counter-argument to my Epicurean 
claim?
24 Sarah Bachelard, “On Euthanasia: Blindspots in the Argument From Mercy,” Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 19, no. 2 (2002): 138.
25 Bernard E. Rollin, “Animal Pain: What It is and Why It Matters,” The Journal of Ethics 15, no. 
4 (2011): 431.
26 For a thorough review of many cases, including the one to follow, Stephen Deakin, “Mercy 
Killing in Battle,” Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 2 (2013): 162-180.
27 Ibid., 169.
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It would be extremely difficult to argue that it was not good for the 
person who is burning alive to be shot and killed (the medic who shot him was 
acquitted at his court martial, likely for this reason.)28 Just as with animals, 
it would seem to be immoral to allow the suffering to continue. But, I also 
think that this view can be consistent with the Epicurean argument that death 
has no value for the person who dies. While the act of killing a suffering 
person relies on the judgment that their life is ending, it is not, I think, about 
weighing possible futures against each other. It is much more immediate than 
that. They are burning alive, their life has been reduced to pure suffering. 
Consider why the medic in the Falkland’s case did not simply hand the 
burning man his rifle and leave the decision about whether to live or die up 
to him. It seems to me that they would simply not be able to act rationally. 
I would suggest that in an important sense, the person had been eclipsed by 
the suffering; the burning soldier had been reduced to the state of grievously 
suffering animals. For what it’s worth, animals that are in a state in which we 
would deem their deaths to be a mercy do not try to kill themselves.29 Of 
course, animals cannot reflect on their lives and their futures, or use tools 
to end their own lives, but this is exactly the point: a person who is in such 
a state of suffering seems to be reduced to this animal state as well. Mercy 
killing, at least in these situations, is just the removal of brute suffering, and 
not the removal of a person. It is, as with animal euthanasia, good, but not 
good for the person who is killed. It is just good simpliciter. And if this is 
true, then by the time an act of mercy killing becomes rational, there is no 
person who would be better off dead, any person has already been destroyed 
by suffering. 
Mercy killing poses truly difficult moral problems. I must confess that 
the way of thinking about mercy killings described in this section may not be 
correct. It seems plausible, but it is predicated on the supposition that mercy 
killing both for animals and people is actually moral. Certainly, the morality 
of mercy killing seems intuitive, but it might be the case that our intuitions 
here are just off. It is likely that our intuitions (or at least mine) are not to be 
trusted, since they have not been put to anything like a real-world test. But if 
this intuition is to be trusted, then I think we can explain why an act of mercy 
killing is rational, while an act of assisted suicide is not.
28 These cases are interesting in part because military judicial systems typically do not 
differentiate mercy killings from murder Many military ethicists have made the case that there 
should be such a distinction, Jean-François Caron, “An Ethical and Judicial Framework for 
Mercy Killing on the Battlefield,” Journal of Military Ethics 13, no. 3 (2014): 228-239.
29 Antonio Preti, “Suicide Among Animals: A Review of Evidence,” Psychological Reports 101, 
no. 3 (2007): 831-848.
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V. Conclusion
When someone dies after a protracted period of suffering, whether their 
death comes naturally or with assistance, it is perhaps understandable that 
their loved ones would have some relief that their suffering was over. The 
expression “at least they are no longer suffering” is expected in such cases. 
What I have argued for here is that one way of understanding this sentiment is 
simply wrong. If one says that it is good for the person who was suffering that 
they are now no longer suffering, then this sentiment is actually meaningless. 
Of course, there are other meanings to the utterance “at least they are no 
longer suffering” that are meaningful. For one (and not a trivial or selfish 
one, I think), one could mean “at least I and others no longer have to witness 
this suffering.” For another, one could mean “at least the world no longer 
contains such suffering.” There may be times when death is good, but it can 
never be a benefit to the one who dies. 
It is also worth remembering that this entire argument (and any Epicurean 
argument) is predicated on the idea that death is really the end of the person 
who dies. If there is an afterlife, then what we call ‘death’ is not really death, 
and one really could exist in a post-mortem state and be either harmed or 
benefitted by one’s own death. 
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